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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL STEVENS,
APPELLEE’S SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF RE: JURISDICTION

Appellant,
v.
MARY ELLEN ROBERTSON,

App. Ct. No. 20170415

Appellee.

INTRODUCTION
In this Supplemental Brief, Appellee Mary Ellen Robertson (“Appellee”) responds
to the Court’s question of whether a district court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or
expand a stipulated, non-child-related non-disparagement clause contained in a final
decree of divorce. For the reasons set forth below, Appellee submits that a district court
does not have such continuing jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT
I.

NO JURISDICTION EXISTS TO MODIFY THE NON-DISPARAGEMENT
CLAUSE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT FALL WITHIN A CLASS OF ISSUES
FOR WHICH CONTINUING JURISDICTION IS AVAILABLE.
Article VIII of the Utah Constitution creates and enumerates the powers of Utah’s

state courts and the scope of their jurisdiction. Article VIII, Section 1 creates, “a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court.” Article VIII, Section 5 defines
the scope of the district court’s original and appellate jurisdiction. The concept of
continuing jurisdiction is not specifically addressed in Article VIII.
While divorce cases certainly fall within the original jurisdiction of the district
courts, principles of res judicata apply to judgments in such cases as any other. See
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (“The doctrine
of res judicata applies in divorce actions.”); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-7 (defining when
decree becomes “absolute”).1 Thus, as in any case, escape from res judicata for the
modification of a final judgment requires a legal basis—whether constitutional, statutory
or judicially-recognized.
In divorce matters, the legislature has opened certain limited doors for
modification of final judgments—essentially, matters that directly relate to the parties’
status as husband, wife, father or mother. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3).
Importantly, the legislature has not granted an unlimited jurisdictional scope that allows
for modification of any matter contained in a final judgment. In this regard, the various
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Appellee refers to and incorporates by reference, but for the sake of brevity will not restate, the
detailed authority set forth in the Court’s Supplemental Order Briefing.

2

change-in-circumstances standards for modification of these final judgments apply only
to the portions of those judgments to which limited continuing jurisdiction has been
granted to address. The issue presented in this appeal does not fall within the scope of
the district court’s continuing jurisdiction.
Finally, Appellee’s research uncovered no case allowing modification of an order
outside of the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3). Under the laws of other
jurisdictions, continuing jurisdiction is similarly limited absent a specific reservation of
jurisdiction contained in the decree itself. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 603 P.2d 650, 652
(Kan. 1979) (“As a general rule, a court has no continuing jurisdiction or power of
modification over a division of property after entering an original divorce decree.”);2
Anderson v. Anderson, 468 N.E.2d 784, 787 (Ohio App. Dist. 2 1984) (“[Ohio law] does
not confer jurisdiction upon a court of common pleas to modify periodic alimony
payments provided for in a separation agreement incorporated in a decree of dissolution
of marriage, at least in the absence of a provision in the separation agreement for such
modification.”).3

2

In an opposite statement of continuing jurisdiction, Kansas law specifically disclaims all
continuing jurisdiction besides custody and child support, as opposed to Utah’s silence on collateral
matters. See K.S.A. § 23-2712(b) (“Matters settled by an agreement incorporated in the decree, other
than matters pertaining to the legal custody, residency, visitation, parenting time, support or education of
the minor children, shall not be subject to subsequent modification by the court except: (1) As prescribed
by the agreement; or (2) as subsequently consented to by the parties.”).
3

Similar to Utah law, Ohio law is silent on modification of collateral issues beyond custody,
support and property division. See O.R.C. § 3105.65(B) (outlining ways a court may modify custody,
child support, spousal support and property division but remaining silent on modification of other issues).
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II.

DOMESTIC LITIGANTS—BUT NOT APPELLANT—MAY STILL
OBTAIN RELIEF UNDER RULE 60 IN APPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Absent another basis for modification of a final judgment, divorce litigants are left

with the same tools as any other civil litigant—those set forth in Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60.4 Under Rule 60(a), clerical errors may be corrected, and under Rules 60(b)
and (d), relief from an order may be obtained. In divorce cases, the most likely basis for
such relief could be Rule 60(b)(5), which would allow a party to be relieved from a
judgment where “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application.” However, neither Rule 60(b)(5), nor any other portion or Rule 60, grants
the district courts power to enter new orders like the order that was requested by
Appellant in this case. Should a party desire a new order against his or her ex-spouse not
within the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) or some other applicable law granting
continuing jurisdiction, he or she may do so by filing a new action and as provided by the
laws applying to ordinary, unrelated parties; he or she may not use the divorce case as a
vehicle to police post-divorce conduct not directly related to the parties’ status as
husband, wife, father or mother.5 The decree of divorce severed the special relationship
these parties had.

4

Appellant never filed a Rule 60 motion, so this brief analysis of Rule 60 is primarily an academic
exercise.
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This rationale is precisely what Appellee has argued to this Court and to the district court
regarding speech issues. Appellant could, and did, file a separate defamation action against Appellee, just
as he could any other person he claimed was publishing false statements about him. The divorce case is
not the proper vehicle to enter new orders on matters that do not directly relate to the parties’ status as

4

REQUESTED RESULT
This Court should find that a district court lacks continuing jurisdiction to modify
provisions of a divorce decree except as within the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3).
Should a party in a divorce proceeding require relief from an onerous provision in a
divorce decree not within the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3), Rule 60(a), (b) or (d)
could allow for such relief depending on the circumstances of that case. But because
Rule 60 does not allow for entry of new orders, Rule 60 does not provide a jurisdictional
basis for the relief requested by Appellant in this case.
Dated this 21st day of October, 2019.
LIEBERMAN SIEBERS, LLC,
By:
[Electronically Signed]

Ben W. Lieberman
Attorney for Appellee

husband, wife, father or mother.
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Attorneys for Appellee:
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